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ABSTRACT. Can we conceive of a mind without body? Does, for example, the idea of the 
soul's immortality make sense? Certain versions of materialism deny such questions; I 
shall try to prove that these versions of materialism cannot be right. They fail because 
they cannot account for the mental vocabulary from the language of brains in the vat. 
Envatted expressions such as "I think", "I believe", etc., do not have to be reinterpreted 
when we translate them to our language; they are semantically stable. By contrast, 
physical expressions from the vat language are semantically instable; due to Putnam's 
externalism they cannot be transported to our language without change. This contrast 
opens the way to a new understanding of what the immortality of the soul might be like: 
A brain in a vat (and its mental life) might survive what the brain calls "my physical 
body's death". 
NOTE. This is a modified version of an unpublished paper originally presented at the 
conference on Epistemology and Metaphysics of the Mental (October 1st—3rd, 2000, 
Heidelberg). Two endnotes and a few entries in the bibliography have been added in 
2012.
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Consciousness without Physical Basis 
A Metaphysical Meditation on the Immortality of the Soul
I. Introduction 
Most of us agree that philosophical proofs in favour of the immortality of the soul 
are fallacious.1 Yet some of us believe in immortality, on the grounds of religious 
faith, while others prefer to take an agnostic stand (or even to deny immortality), 
because they want to avoid wishful thinking. And then there is a group of highly 
sophisticated people—mostly philosophers—who claim that the whole quarrel is 
besides the point because it does not even make sense to say that our soul can 
survive the death of our body.2
To support their claim they typically argue as follows. We cannot ascribe mental
properties to any entity unless we can ascribe physical properties to it as well; 
furthermore, there are no identity criteria for somebody's soul which are not at 
least partly based on identity criteria for her body. If this is right then talk about 
"souls without body" amounts to playing with empty words.3
Is it nonsense to speak about a soul, or the mind, or some kind of consciousness 
(sufficiently similar to ours) which goes on existing without any physical basis? Is 
it a conceptual impossibility? I shall try to convince you that it is not. The goal of 
my paper is to imagine a subject who rightly claims that her mental characteristics 
(such as consciousness, thoughts, experiences, feelings, sense impressions, etc.) 
are completely divorced from physical characteristics (such as brain states, overt 
behavior, content and structure of the physical environment, etc.) To be sure, I do 
not aim at describing a subject whose mental characteristics do not have any non-
mental basis whatsoever; rather my subject's mental life will be based upon 
metaphysical, or supernatural, facts—not upon physical facts. The differences 
between these two kinds of facts will be explained in due course. 
II. Two Unhappy Strategies 
There are two strategies for defending the cognitive significance of claims about 
immortality which I want to mention only in order to put them aside for the 
remainder of our discussion. The first strategy appeals to the Logical Positivist's 
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well-known principle of verification (as a criterion of cognitive significance4).
The strategy was adopted (among others) by Moritz Schlick, who insisted that 
there is a method of verification for hypotheses such as: 
(1) Mentally I shall survive my body's death. 
Schlick summarized the method in question with the beautiful words "Wait until 
you die".5 This proposal is perhaps outdated because Schlick's test of hypothesis 
(1) can only be performed from an entirely private, essentially subjective, or 
anyway phenomenalistic point of view—which nowadays seems suspect to the 
majority of philosophers. Although the proposal might deserve some closer 
attention, I shall neglect it in order to save space.6
If we do not wish to appeal to possible evidence which can only be assessed from 
a non-naturalist, first-person perspective, then we might try to make progress by 
imagining possible empirical evidence as we know it from the natural sciences: 
Such evidence must be intersubjective, i.e., publicly available. But how are we to 
imagine possible evidence which makes it plausible from outside that a certain 
subject survived her physical death? The literature on parapsychology is full of 
answers to that question. It seems too easy to imagine publicly available evidence 
which would convince us that the ghost of, say, a dead friend of ours 
communicates surprisingly specific messages in the course of a séance or 
suchlike.7
This second strategy for defending the cognitive significance of the idea of 
immortality will also be neglected in this paper. Here is my main reason for 
putting it aside. If that strategy succeeded at all, it could only help in defending 
the conceivability of ideas about immortality which are rather naive, or 
unsophisticated, such as this one: 
(1') Mentally I shall survive my body's death, so that I'll be able to send both 
cheerful messages to the bereaved and threatening curses to former 
enemies. 
The strategy does not and cannot offer help to ideas which are more interesting 
from a spiritual point of view, ideas according to which the surviving soul is 
imagined to be forever detached from all mundane matters and earthly fetters. 
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III. Metaphysical Perspectives 
In the preceding section I decided against stories told from the perspective of the 
subject concerned as well as against stories told from an outside perspective. So 
we find ourselves in the position of someone who does not allow himself to solve 
a riddle, neither while standing inside the circle nor while standing outside it. Is 
there a third standpoint from which the riddle can be solved? Possibly yes; 
perhaps from above the circle.
Let us see whether a similar change of perspective might help in our case. As I 
said, I do not want to solve the problem from an inside perspective, appealing to 
merely subjective observations; nor do I want to solve it from an outside 
perspective, that is, by way of imagining empirical, scientific observations in the 
physical world. Where is the third perspective from which we might succeed? It 
is, I want to urge, the perspective of metaphysics. Meta-physics: by this I mean a 
perspective which is placed above, or beyond, the physical level. 
(I shall use expressions like "physics", "physical level", etc., so as to cover all 
levels of reality which are open, in principle, to empirical, scientific investigation. 
In so doing I can simplify my formulations, with apologies to chemists, biologists, 
geographers, etc.) 
In order to set up my argument I shall assume that a materialist (or if you prefer, 
naturalist or physicalistic) picture of mental phenomena is right. (This is a natural 
starting point for our enterprise because materialism is the doctrine which backs 
up my opponent's claim that the idea of immortality is senseless.) By appealing to 
some additional assumptions, which I hope you'll find plausible, I shall infer that 
there are, or can be, mental phenomena for which materialists cannot possibly 
have an account. In short, I want to give a reductio ad absurdum of materialism. 
To be sure, I shall not venture to launch a full-scale attack on each possible 
version of materialism. My target is more limited: I shall try to attack precisely 
those versions of materialism which threaten the very conceivability of the soul's 
immortality. The goal of this paper is not entirely destructive though. If we 
manage to leave behind certain versions of materialism, then (I hope) we shall 
gain a better understanding of what the metaphysical point of view could be, and 
how we might think or speak about the immortality of the soul. 
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IV. The Brain in the Vat 
Consider the following thought experiment. We kidnap a new-born infant, open 
his head, steal the brain, bury the rest of the body, and put the brain in a vat of 
nutrients so that it can survive as long as we wish. We connect the brain's nerve 
endings to the famous superscientific computer which, what a coincidence, turns 
out to be programmed in such a way that it simulates an ordinary human life for 
our victim (a life, that is, which the complete infant would have lived if we had 
not interfered in the first place). 
Scenarios like this have been described very often; the most significant version is 
due to Hilary Putnam.8 I want you to imagine a version which diverges from 
Putnam's in one crucial aspect: According to Putnam's version we are brains in a 
vat; according to my version, we (you and me) are not envatted. In my version of 
the scenario, the envatted victim is a third party—somebody else, a certain infant. 
This is an important difference. Let us note some of its implications. Putnam told 
the story in the way he did (i.e., from the first-person perspective), because he 
wanted to prove that his scenario is self-refuting.9 An important element in this 
famous refutation is the usage of the word "we". Putnam's conclusion is: 
(2) We are not brains in the vat. 
The proof cannot be turned against my scenario where neither you nor I (nor 
Putnam) is in the vat but an infant. Putnam's refutation does not have a parallel in 
the following: 
(3) The infant is not a brain in the vat.10
The main idea behind Putnam's refutation is that an envatted subject is unable to 
speak about his own situation because his words fail to refer to brains, vats, 
computers, and other material objects on that level.11 What is the reason for this 
failure of reference? The answer derives from Putnam's externalism: A speaker 
can only refer to objects of a certain kind if he has stood in (direct or indirect) 
causal contact with at least some objects of the kind in question.12 Reference 
without any causal contact would be magic, says Putnam—and many 
philosophers agree that magical theories of reference should be put aside.13
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Let us apply this externalist doctrine to our case of an envatted brain. As our 
victim was envatted in early childhood, it lacks causal contact with material 
things from the external world. When it thinks and speaks about "tigers" and 
"brains" then this is caused not by true tigers or true brains but by the 
supercomputer. Thus, the envatted brain does not and cannot refer to true tigers or 
true brains. 
The upshot of this is the following. Even though envatted brains are physically 
possible,14 there is no envatted brain that can say that it is a brain in a vat.15 This 
applies to the envatted infant as much as to us. Are we perhaps in the vat? If so, 
we have (right now!) managed to say that we are; but a moment ago we saw that 
no brain in a vat can say that it is in a vat. So we are not envatted.16
V. Reinterpreting the Language of an Envatted Brain 
In the preceding section you have seen that an envatted brain cannot refer to true 
tigers or true brains. Surely, its words "tiger" or "brain" must refer to something.
But what then? I think the answer is to be found in the supercomputer.17 Certain 
complicated codes, which are stored in its memory, must be causally responsible 
for the brain's enjoying tiger-like sense impressions; certain other codes will cause 
impressions of kangaroos. Let us call the former codes "cybertigers" and the latter 
ones "cyberroos". (For the sake of imagining something concrete, I want to 
assume that cybertigers are an isomorphic representation of those elementary 
particles that make up a true tiger. Similarly for cyberroos, cyberbrains, 
cyberrivers, and cyberclouds.) 
In sum, when an envatted brain uses an expression such as "tiger", it does not 
refer to true tigers but only to cybertigers. So the language of an envatted brain 
cannot be taken at face value. When we want to understand what an envatted 
brain says, then we must reinterpret its language. 
Not every word from the vat language needs to be changed when translated into 
our language. It seems clear, for example, that the envatted expressions for logical 
operators (such as "not", "or", etc.) do not demand reinterpretation. 
Before I proceed I wish to introduce a notion which comes to mind in quite 
obvious fashion when we start wondering about the limits of the externalist 
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doctrine as applied to vat language. Let us call an expression "semantically stable" 
when we can transport it without change from the vat language to our's.18 Not 
only logical expressions are semantically stable; also the temporal vocabulary is. 
As the envatted brain's stream of consciousness is temporally ordered as much as 
our's, there is no reason to make up a difference between their temporal 
expressions and our temporal expressions. Envatted expressions such as "while", 
"when", "later", "now", etc., do not call for reinterpretation when translated into 
our language.19
By contrast, spatial vocabulary is not semantically stable. When the envatted 
brain says 
(4) Greenland is 300 miles from this island, 
then we have to translate this as follows: 
(4') Cybergreenland is 300 cybermiles from this cyberisland.20
(If we had translated the spatial expression "300 miles from" without change, then 
we would have to assume that the supercomputer must have a diameter of at least 
300 miles, which is absurd.) 
Natural kind terms and observation terms are of course semantically instable. The 
whole descriptive vocabulary from the natural sciences (including the biological 
term "brain") is semantically instable. This has a nice consequence. When an 
envatted scientist produces an observation sentence such as: 
(5) There is a tiger close to me, 
then we need not claim that he is wrong (due to the absence of true tigers). To the 
contrary, he will be right, because the sentence must be reinterpreted: 
(5') There is a cybertiger in my cybernetic neighborhood, 
and because in general there really will be a cybertiger when the envatted scientist 
is disposed to produce sentence (5).21 (Remember that it is cybertigers which are 
responsible for tiger-like sense impressions in the vat.) 
This means that even envatted observation sentences have an overall tendency 
towards truth. And if an envatted scientist builds an empirical theory upon his 
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observations, then his envatment does not threaten the adequacy of that theory. In 
short, the thought experiment of envatment does not lead to skepticism. 
VI. Envatted Thoughts 
Can we grant genuine mental life to the brain in the vat? I think we have to. To 
see why, remember that I've started from materialist assumptions concerning 
mental phenomena. If mental phenomena are based upon physical phenomena, 
then it is most reasonable to assume that two brains which are exactly alike as 
regards physical composition and structure must also be capable of the same types 
of mental activity. 
Let us be a little more specific about this. The brain in the vat may be imagined to 
have an unenvatted twin, who was saved when we kidnapped his brother in early 
childhood; we can imagine that the brain which we have envatted and the brain 
outside the vat are exactly alike (that is, qualitatively identical). 
When we idealize the situation as far as that, materialism seems to imply that the 
envatted subject is capable of mental life because his unenvatted twin brain is. 
(And the latter's mental capacities we assume to be obvious; the unenvatted brain 
belongs to an ordinary human being, after all.) 
But let us be careful; we should not be misled into hasty simplifications. Even in 
our idealized situation (where we compare an envatted and an unenvatted brain, 
whose states, physical structure and composition are exactly alike) it would be 
wrong to conclude that the two brains lead the same mental life; the truth is that 
they don't. 
They do not lead identical mental lives because of Putnam's externalism. When 
the twin of our envatted brain thinks about tigers then his counterpart may well be 
in exactly the same brain state—it will still not manage to think about tigers, for 
lack of causal connection. Rather on that occasion, the envatted brain thinks about 
cybertigers.
So Putnam's externalism does not only apply to the meaning and reference of 
sentences such as 
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(6) There is a tiger over there. 
It carries over to the content and reference of thought.22
This does not run counter to materialism; on the contrary, it is an implication of 
reasonably non-magical, causal accounts of (mental) reference. According to 
these causal, materialist accounts, thinking about tigers is a matter of being in a 
certain brain state plus being situated in an environment having a certain physical 
structure; thinking about cybertigers involves being in the very same brain state 
but being situated in an environment having a quite different physical structure. 
So let us agree that the thoughts of two qualitatively identical brains can be 
different; the envatted brain does not lead the same mental life as his unenvatted 
twin brain. But I want to insist that they are both leading a mental life. 
Indeed, this is an assumption which was with us all the time in the course of my 
externalist reflections. I said that the envatted brain thinks about cybertigers while 
its twin thinks about true tigers. The type of mental activity is the same; only its 
content is different. 
My next claim is this: If the envatted brain is able to think (as much as we are able 
to), then—like us—it is also able to speak about thinking. The brain's linguistic 
capacities are appropriate for identifying, naming, and describing its own 
thoughts. In other words, the envatted term "thought" is semantically stable. Let 
us look at an example. When the brain says 
(7) I think about tigers, 
then this must be reinterpreted because of Putnam's externalism. However, 
nothing but the natural kind term "tiger" has to be changed, so we get the 
following translation: 
(7') I think about cybertigers.23
While the envatted brain is not in touch with true tigers, it certainly is in touch 
with its own thoughts. This is the reason for the interpretative disanalogy between 
"tiger" and "thought". 
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Against this you may object that for success in referring to thoughts you must be 
able to identify not only your own thoughts but also those of others.24 Fine; so I 
have to claim that our brain in the vat can identify the thoughts of its envatted 
colleagues. And indeed that seems right. Suppose two envatted friends receive 
tiger-like stimulations which derive from one and the same cybertiger; and 
suppose the first brain says to the second brain "I am afraid of this tiger"; then the 
following sentences from the second brain say something true: "My friend is 
afraid of this tiger" or "My friend thinks about a tiger". If you still do not want to 
grant this, you would have to hold that the two envatted brains are unable to 
communicate. But why should they be unable? After all, they are fluent in 
dialogue about "tigers" as much as about "emotions elicited by tigers". 
So the semantic stability of "to think" carries over to many other expressions from 
our mental vocabulary. Here are some further examples for semantic stability: 
to be afraid; to wonder; doubt; experience; observation; belief; mental 
activity; etc. 
How can we reconcile the semantic stability of words like these with Putnam's 
externalism? Isn't there a tension here, particularly for adherents of materialism? 
No; Putnam's externalism puts causal constraints on the reference, or content, of 
speech and thought. But our mental vocabulary has not only referring function; it 
does not only occur in referring position (specifying the content of propositional 
attitudes). It often serves for expressing propositional attitudes. When I say "I 
believe that many wild tigers live in India" then I do not (always) intend to 
describe my mental life; rather I intend to describe India's fauna. We should not 
be surprised that Putnam's externalism (i.e., a thesis about reference) does not 
force us to reinterpret vocabulary whose main function does not lie in referring. 
(It would be odd to insist that an envatted Fregean judgement stroke must be 
reinterpreted because of Putnam's externalism.) 
VII. The Brain's False Doctrine about Thought 
Now I am in the position to do our first step towards the reductio ad absurdum
that I had promised. Let us look at the situation from the perspective of our 
envatted speaker. Is materialism the right view about mental phenomena from his 
perspective?
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It is not too important to find out how the speaker in the vat would reply to these 
questions, or which of his answers would be justified, given his information. What 
matters to us is something entirely different. What matters is what his correct
answers to these questions have to look like, whether or not he can find or justify 
them. 
So suppose the brain in the vat states its materialist doctrine as follows: 
(8) My thoughts are identical to certain physical events.25
Is this a true statement when uttered by the brain in the vat? Clearly not; for when 
we translate the sentence into our language and reinterpret all and only its 
semantically instable vocabulary, then we obtain this: 
(8') My thoughts are identical to certain cyberphysical events. 
Here we have a false description of envatted thoughts. Given materialism, they 
are identical not to cyberphysical events, taking place in the supercomputer, but to 
physical events that take place in the envatted brain itself.26
This consideration provides the core of the advertised reductio ad absurdum. Its 
structure is as follows: We assume materialism for describing the mental situation 
of an envatted speaker in order to show that his materialism is wrong. 
You may ask: Does this really provide a reductio ad absurdum? Isn't the 
materialism, which is supposed to be the point of departure for the reductio,
different from the materialism which gets repudiated in the end? Granted: We 
depart from our materialism and repudiate the envatted brain's materialism. If, 
therefore, my opponent wishes to defend his materialist doctrine, then he should 
try to divorce his own version of materialism from its envatted counterpart. This 
divorce will take place in the next section (VIII). It will force me to invoke an 
additional premiss in order to complete my reductio (section IX). 
VIII. The Semantic Destabilization of Materialism 
What the argument from the last section shows is that there may be subjects 
whose contingent situation (of, e.g., envatment) makes their materialist doctrine 
false; more accurately: that there may be subjects whose contingent situation 
makes false what they call "materialism". 
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On first sight, this result does not give us much; it seems compatible with what we
call "materialism". To see why, I want to ask whether the term "materialism" is 
semantically stable or instable. If it were semantically instable then my reductio
ad absurdum would not yet be convincing, because in this case nothing of interest 
would follow from my repudiation of envatted "materialism": Should the term 
"materialism" turn out to be semantically instable, then the doctrine that we call 
"materialism" would be entirely different from the doctrine that an envatted brain
calls so; and the repudiation of the envatted materialist doctrine would not carry 
over to our own materialist doctrine.27
Therefore, my materialist opponent has good motives for destabilizing the term 
"materialism". Are his chances of reaching that goal good? One might think so. 
Among other things, the materialist doctrine speaks about "physical events". But 
because this expression is semantically instable, an envatted brain cannot manage 
to speak about physical events, and thus, necessarily fails to express what we call 
"materialism". (It can only express cyber-materialism, i.e., the false doctrine that 
thoughts are identical to certain cyberphysical events.) 
Although I am not sure whether I find this line of reasoning convincing, I want to 
agree to it for the sake of argument. 
Given this, my reductio ad absurdum of materialism from the preceding section is 
not convincing, as was observed at the outset of the present section. But my anti-
materialist case is not yet lost. In order to win it, I'll force my opponent to claim 
more than he has done hitherto. As you'll see in the next section, my opponent is 
obliged to admit that his materialist doctrine has a very peculiar semantic status. 
In our dialectical situation the doctrine must be understood as a conceptual claim 
about the mental. 
IX. Conceptualist Materialism—Reduced to Absurdity 
Remember that I am concerned here with defending the conceivability of 
consciousness without physical basis, and of the soul's immortality. Accordingly, 
I do not need to repudiate those forms of materialism which claim that as a matter 
of fact our thoughts happen to be identical to certain physical events. For if 
materialism expresses only a factual truth then its falsity will still be conceivable. 
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(When a claim about the facts is true, and thus, makes sense, then its negation 
must make sense too.) 
So we are dealing here with a stronger form of materialism: materialism as a 
conceptual claim, a claim about the very meaning of our mental vocabulary.28
Only in this analytic form can materialism be thought to imply that all talk about 
consciousness without physical basis is meaningless nonsense; only this analytic 
version of materialism will be the victim of my reductio.29
The first step of the reductio of conceptualist materialism was established in 
section VII: Given the truth of our materialist doctrine, the envatted "materialist" 
doctrine is false. This is not yet dangerous for my opponent, if we agree (as I did 
in the preceding section) that the word "materialism" is semantically instable. In 
this dialectical situation I have still not refuted materialism (a doctrine concerning 
thoughts and physical events), but only what an envatted brain happens to call 
"materialism", that is—in our language—cyber-materialism (a doctrine 
concerning thoughts and cyberphysical events). 
In order to complete the projected reductio I need to take one additional step. If 
our materialism is an analytic truth, then (I submit) cyber-materialism must be 
analytically true, too. To see why this must be so, let us investigate more 
generally what happens when an envatted brain repeats any sentence which is 
analytically true in our language. For example: 
(9) No bachelor is female. 
True, in the language of an envatted brain, the words from (9) mean, and refer to, 
something different than in our language. The envatted word "female" refers to 
cyberwomen, the envatted word "bachelor" to certain cybermen (to those who 
have never undergone a cyberwedding). But this reinterpretation affects all
referring terms from the vat language, and it affects them all in the very same way.
When envatted brains repeat our words then the relation between our words and 
the world gets turned into an isomorphic relation between their words and the 
cyberworld. Notice, however, that this reinterpretation leaves untouched the 
mutual—conceptual—relations among the words themselves. Cyberbachelors fail 
to be cyberfemale in the very same way bachelors fail to be female. 
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So my claim is that the very same sentences are analytic in our language and in 
the vat language.30
Given this, I can complete my reductio of conceptualist materialism. 
(i) Assumption: The sentence "All thoughts are identical to certain physical 
events" is an analytic truth in our language. 
(ii) All thoughts are identical to certain physical events. (From (i); 
disquotation.)
(iii) Envatted thoughts are identical to certain physical events. (From (ii).) 
(iv) When an envatted brain says "All thoughts are identical to certain physical 
events", then this is true iff all thoughts are identical to certain 
cyberphysical events. (Externalist reinterpretation of semantically instable 
words.)
(v) The envatted sentence "All thoughts are identical to certain physical 
events" is false. (From (iii) and (iv).) 
(vi) If a sentence is analytically true in our language, then its envatted 
counterpart is analytically true in the vat language. (From the definition of 
analyticity and the description of the vat scenario.31)
(vii) The envatted sentence "All thoughts are identical to certain physical 
events" is analytically true in the vat language. (From (i) and (vi).) 
In order to avoid the contradiction between (v) and (vii) I conclude that our 
assumption (i)—conceptualist materialism—must have been false; it is not the 
meanings of our concepts which guarantee that thoughts have to be identical to 
certain physical events. 
X. Other Versions of Materialism 
In the last three sections I assumed materialism, as formulated on our level 
outside the vat, in order to repudiate the envatted parallel of materialism, which in 
turn gave me ammunition against conceptualist materialism on our level. (This 
was the heart of my reductio ad absurdum.)
My argument was directed against versions of materialism which employ an 
identity thesis such as this one: 
(8) My thoughts are identical to certain physical events. 
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But it seems clear that the reductio works not only against materialists who 
believe in an identity thesis, but also against those who subscribe to 
supervenience. When an envatted brain says: 
(10) My thoughts supervene on certain physical events, 
which must be translated into our language as follows: 
(10') My thoughts supervene on certain cyberphysical events, 
then this is wrong, given the truth of supervenience on our level. (Given the truth 
of supervenience on our level, the envatted brain's thoughts supervene on neural 
events, happening in a true brain, not on cyberneural events in the 
supercomputer.) 
And again, when the materialist comes up with something other than identity or 
supervenience, I can repeat my argument. For example, I can run a reductio on the 
following version of materialism: 
(11) My thoughts are based upon physical events. 
To be sure, my argument does not show that materialist doctrines such as (8), 
(10), and (11) are false. The argument shows merely that these claims cannot be 
conceptual truths. This is good news for the metaphysical idea of immortality; we 
can expect that it will soon be released from the charge of being inconceivable. 
Before freeing it from that charge (at the end of this paper), I want to say 
something more general about the language of metaphysics. The ambition of the 
following sections is to make it plausible that the language of an envatted brain 
has metaphysical resources sufficiently strong so as to enable the brain to 
speculate about its own mental situation. 
XI. Beyond Nature 
We saw that many envatted sentences about the brain's thoughts turned out false, 
due to materialism on our level. You may ask: Given the (factual, i.e., non-
conceptual) truth of any version of materialism on our level, what is the right 
theory on the level of an envatted brain? Of course, when the brain in the vat 
denies its original sentences, it says something true: 
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(12) My thoughts are not identical to certain physical events. 
(13) My thoughts do not supervene on certain physical events. 
(14) My thoughts are not based upon physical events. 
But with these negative claims we should not be satisfied. We want to see which 
positive account of mental phenomena would be right when put forward by the 
brain in the vat. Let us imagine that the envatted speaker is willing to risk 
something and wishes to claim more than in statements (12)—(14). For example, 
he might limit the scope of the negation in these statements as follows: 
(15) My thoughts are identical to non-physical events. 
(16) My thoughts supervene on non-physical events. 
(17) The basis of my thinking is beyond physics. 
Remember that for convenience I have been using the expressions "physics", 
"physical", etc., in a very broad sense throughout this paper. This means that 
(negative) sentences such as (15)—(17) are more radical than may seem on first 
sight. In a more explicit form they say something like this: 
(18) My thoughts are identical to non-natural events. 
(19) My thoughts supervene on super-natural events. 
(20) The basis of my thinking is beyond nature. 
These are very risky claims indeed. What exactly are they supposed to mean? 
When we speak about nature then we refer to a realm of entities and events, which 
are located in space and time, which can stand in direct or indirect causal contact 
with one another and with us, and which, therefore, are in principle open to 
empirical scientific investigation. But what is a realm beyond nature supposed to 
be? What is the super-natural?32
It is easier to answer this question not for our language but for that of an envatted 
brain. Let us first clarify what the envatted term "nature" means. When the 
envatted brain speaks about nature, this refers to a realm of entities and events 
with which the brain can stand in direct or indirect causal connection. The 
envatted expression "nature" covers cyberobjects in cyberspace, that is, codes in 
the supercomputer's memory—plus their changes (that is to say, cyberevents). 
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But in statements (18)—(20) the envatted brain speaks about a realm beyond
nature. What does that mean? Well, if we remember what the envatted term 
"nature" means, then it seems clear that its term "beyond nature" refers to a realm 
of things beyond the brain's cyberspace, i.e., beyond the memory of the 
supercomputer. The term covers material objects such as true tigers. 
It covers a realm of things about which the envatted brain cannot possibly gain 
empirical knowledge, due to lack of appropriate causal connection. To the brain in 
the vat, supernatural things are things which are natural things for us. They are 
material objects which are located in the surroundings of the vat, the computer, 
and the envatted brain. The brain, the vat, and the computer are themselves 
"supernatural things" from the envatted point of view.33
If this is right then the brain in the vat says something true when it produces 
statements such as (18)—(20), because their translation runs thus: 
(18') My thoughts are identical to events that do not take place in the 
supercomputer. 
(19') My thoughts supervene on natural events. 
(20') The basis of my thinking is beyond the supercomputer. 
(In uttering sentences which must be so translated, the envatted brain says 
something true although it does not and cannot know that it has hit on the truth.) 
XII. Metaphors and Charity 
You may ask how an envatted brain manages to refer to entities with which it 
does not stand in causal connection at all? Doesn't this violate the causal 
constraints on reference invoked by Putnam's externalism? 
Yes, it does. But don't be afraid of that. When properly understood, Putnam's 
externalism must be restricted to words that one uses for describing natural 
phenomena—the phenomena with which one can (in principle) stand in causal 
connection. Externalism is most plausible when applied to natural kind terms. (It 
holds good for other expressions from the natural sciences, too.) 
But the externalist doctrine fails when applied to words that do not even pretend 
to refer to things via causal connection. The doctrine fails, for example, for 
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numerals. (That is to say, numerals are semantically stable; the envatted word 
"seven" does not need to be reinterpreted.) Externalism also fails for talk about 
the supernatural—or so I want to claim. 
In statements such as (18)—(20), the envatted speaker explicitly goes beyond the 
domain of things that are accessible to him for empirical investigation. The 
vocabulary from (18)—(20) is not made for expressing scientific truths, and it 
does not pretend to; it belongs to another language game. 
It may be instructive to have a closer look at an essential element from the boldest 
sentence that we have come across up to now: 
(20) The basis of my thinking is beyond nature. 
In everyday life, and in the sciences, the word "beyond" has a spatial meaning, 
and in this usage, it is subject to externalist reinterpretation (when uttered by an 
envatted brain). But I have left the word untouched when I translated the envatted 
sentence (20) into our language: 
(20') The basis of my thinking is beyond cybernature. 
This means that the original sentence (20) was not interpreted as a statement from 
the vat sciences; the word "beyond" was not understood in the literal meaning 
(signifying cyberspatial relations between codes in the memory of the 
supercomputer). 
Rather, we have understood the word metaphorically, signifying something 
analogous to what the brain usually describes with the word "beyond". What 
gives us the right to interpret the envatted statement (20) metaphorically? Two 
reasons: charity and fantasy. 
Let me explain. First, if we interpreted the spatial expression from statement (20) 
literally, not metaphorically, then we would obtain plain nonsense. (It would 
amount to speaking about a spatial place beyond space; or rather about something 
which is simultaneously inside and outside the brain's cyberspace.34)
A very good, old maxim for interpretation is the celebrated principle of charity. It 
warns us against ascribing excessively weird opinions to an interpretee. If 
possible (the principle says) we should find an interpretation that diminishes the 
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amount of craziness which we blame on the speaker.35 And in the present case 
there is a more charitable interpretation at hand than the literal one, an 
interpretation that avoids ascribing nonsensical statements to the envatted brain. 
Surely, the charitable interpretation of the envatted statement: 
(20) The basis of my thinking is beyond nature, 
is the translation I have given: 
(20') The basis of my thinking is beyond cybernature. 
As you have seen, the trick in this translation is to read the expression "beyond" 
not literally but as an envatted metaphor. This we can do because it is a metaphor 
that speaks to us. We are open to that metaphor, due to our fantastic fantasy for 
playing with words which are literally empty but not empty for us.
Much more would have to be said about metaphor; alas, the subject is beyond the 
scope of this paper. But before we leave it altogether I want to mention briefly 
two observations concerning the envatted metaphor of a "realm beyond nature". 
First, the charitable interpretation of statement (20) forced us to ascribe to the 
brain in the vat a metaphorical use of its expression "beyond"; but in our 
translation we were able to unpack the metaphor, employing our word "beyond" 
in its literal, spatial meaning. It is interesting that, unlike us, the brain in the vat 
cannot unpack its own metaphor. This is due to its lack of causal connection to 
what we call spatial objects. 
But even though it does not know how to unpack the metaphor, nor whether the 
metaphor can be unpacked so that it refers to something, it can still be aware that 
the word "beyond" in its own sentence (20) is being used metaphorically. The 
brain in the vat knows (as well as we do) that the literal understanding of the 
expression "beyond" produces nonsense in the sentence (20). 
This brings me to the second observation that I announced. As the brain in the vat 
understands its own statement (20) metaphorically, it can explicitly guard it 
against literal misunderstandings. For it can rephrase it as follows: 
(20*) The basis of my thinking is beyond nature, but not in the literal, spatial 
sense of the word "beyond". 
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If you were not convinced by my charitable interpretation (20') of the original 
envatted statement (20), then I hope you will at least agree that in (20*), the word 
"beyond" should not be read literally. (Otherwise your unwillingness to charity 
goes far beyond what a good interpreter can afford.) 
XIII. Metaphysical Discourse 
Perhaps you find it a little unsatisfactory that the whole burden of my reasoning 
has come to rest upon the unsharp notion of metaphor. It seems trivial and 
uninformative to be told that there are metaphorical modes of speech which are 
not governed by the strict rules of externalist accounts of reference. It might be 
helpful if I could say something more concrete about the specific use of metaphor 
which I have brought into play. 
To what kind of discourse does the quasi-spatial expression "beyond" belong? It 
belongs, I submit, either to religious discourse or to the discourse of metaphysics. 
I shall not say much about the metaphor's place in religious discourse. Suffice it to 
say that, in religious speech, expressions like "beyond nature" are often used for 
formulating statements that express religious faith. Think of statements which say 
that earthly matters are unimportant because there is some kind of higher reality 
with which we should be concerned first of all. Notice that it is a typical move in 
religious discourse to warn against literal understandings, a move similar to mine 
in (20*). 
In the discourse of metaphysics, by contrast, we have less confidence in the truth 
and reference of statements that contain metaphorical expressions such as 
"beyond nature". As I conceive of it, metaphysics is a discipline for posing 
significant questions—questions which cannot possibly be answered by the 
sciences. The domain of the sciences is nature, that of metaphysics (meta-
physics!) is beyond nature. (There are as many conceptions of metaphysics as 
there are metaphysicians. Of course, I do not claim to have the copyright for that 
word.)
Thus it is obvious that the old positivist sense criterion cannot be appropriate for 
metaphysical questions. Neither is externalism appropriate for determining the 
extension of metaphorical, metaphysical expressions. 
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Even so, a metaphysical question should be clear. It must allow us to say what it 
would be like if one of the answers to it were right. Because the use of metaphors 
and analogies is far less restricted than that of natural kind terms and other 
expressions from the sciences, the difference between clarity and obscurity 
becomes crucial in metaphysics. There is no fixed canon of rules (no algorithm) 
for posing and clarifying good metaphysical questions. (But then, neither is there 
an algorithm for solving scientific problems.36)
Perhaps I should make explicit which method for clarifying metaphysical 
questions I have wanted to follow throughout this paper. Instead of posing 
metaphysical questions from our own perspective, I have put them in somebody 
else's mouth, somebody whose situation we can supervise from above, from a 
perspective which is not open to him in principle. From outside we have been 
looking at the situation of the brain in the vat and at what is going on in his world, 
in the supercomputer. 
I have been trying to understand the envatted brain's metaphysical statement: 
(20) The basis of my thinking is beyond nature, 
or rather, its metaphysical question: 
(21) Is there a realm beyond nature? 
In search of a charitable interpretation we have appreciated how the use of 
metaphors makes possible reference without causal connection. (There was no 
mystery about this; rather, it followed naturally from applying the principle of 
charity.)
This exercise was not performed for the sake of the envatted brain; we performed 
it for ourselves, for clarifying our metaphysical question: 
(21) Is there a realm beyond nature? 
The fantasy of the brain in the vat gives us a picture, or a simile, of what it would 
be like if the answer to our question was "yes". The simile clarifies our question, 
it improves our understanding of it—but it does not yield a literal, non-
metaphorical reformulation of the question. The simile plays a role comparable to 
that of Plato's myth of the cave. This is more than nothing. Unless you are blinded 
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by anti-metaphysical prejudice, you should admit, I think, that it increases your 
control over the idea of the supernatural when you contemplate that idea by way 
of analogy. You could, for example, imagine yourself in the position of someone 
who really is (like an envatted brain) dependent on what he calls the 
"supernatural" (e.g., the vat).37
So much about metaphysical language in general. Let us return to my starting 
point and see whether what we have learnt applies to the idea of immortality. 
XIV. Death in the Vat 
In order to clarify metaphysical questions concerning immortality I shall try to 
repeat the line of thought that has helped us in clarifying questions concerning the 
supernatural. I shall look from outside at somebody whose mental life does not 
end at the moment of what he calls his "biological death". This will bring us to an 
understanding of what the soul's immortality might be like. 
In order to divorce biological and mental death, I do not need to invent another 
thought experiment. It suffices to continue the one with which we were dealing all 
the time: the thought experiment of the brain in the vat. The projected divorce 
should be easy; my main idea will be that mental expressions are semantically 
stable while biological expressions are not. 
Let us imagine the situation of our envatted victim shortly before its death. After 
seventy years of envatment, the victim suffers from simulated symptoms of 
terminal illness, say, simulated lung cancer. The lungs aren't there, of course—
neither is there any cancer. (Where would it be?) But the pain is there none the 
less. The brain is connected not to true lungs but to cyberlungs, that is to certain 
parts of the cybernetic representation of the human body which our victim would 
have had, had he not been envatted seventy years ago. 
So we have a sad case of cybernetic lung cancer. (There are cybercancer cells 
spreading all over the cyberlung.) What happens next? According to a 
conservative version of Putnam's scenario, the story will end rather soon; 
according to my version, the story will last longer. 
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As the cyberpulse stops, the supercomputer simulates a sudden attack of pain; and 
then: nothing. The computer stops sending further impulses to the brain in the vat, 
because the cyberbody begins to decompose (so that its cybernose, cybereyes, 
cybernetic pain receptors, etc., do not function any longer). 
What about the envatted brain itself? (Notice that this is not a question about the 
subject's cyberbrain, which undergoes cybernetic decomposition as much as the 
rest of the cyberbody whose death is being simulated. The question is about a true 
brain—the one which we had stolen and envatted seventy years ago.) 
Up to now, the envatted brain is still alive. True, it does not enjoy sensory 
stimulation any longer; its experiential field is empty, black, and silent—apart, 
perhaps, from phantom pain. 
But the envatted brain can still think; and it is likely to be frightened.—Or, is it 
really? This depends; we can continue the story however we wish. 
According to the conservative version of Putnam's scenario, the envatted brain 
must be killed at the moment of its simulated death. In this scenario, the true 
brain's biological death coincides with the simulated cyberbrain's death. 
In my scenario, on the other hand, we prolong the biological life of the envatted 
brain beyond the moment of its simulated death. How are we to do this? As 
before: We have to supply sufficient amounts of nutrients, we have to control the 
fluid's temperature, we have to prevent the brain from inflammation, and so forth. 
XV. The Immortality of the Soul 
To sum up the result from the preceding section, it seems theoretically possible 
that we can keep the envatted brain alive beyond the moment when the computer 
ceases to supply simulations of an ordinary life. 
Of course, I have not literally described a situation where a subject continues 
leading its mental life without physical basis. The physical basis of the subject's 
mental life is the brain in the vat. But the scenario helps us to see what it would be 
like to survive one's own death. For if we look at the situation from the linguistic 
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standpoint of the envatted brain, then we do have a case where the mental life 
lasts longer than the biological life. 
Suppose the envatted brain suffers from cyberlung cancer and raises the following 
question:
(22) Will my mental life last longer than the biological life of my body? 
Mental and temporal notions are semantically stable, biological ones are not. So 
when we translate the question into our language, we obtain this: 
(22') Will my mental life last longer than the cyberbiological life of my 
cyberbody? 
And the positive answer to this question yields a true description of the scenario 
we have been imagining. 
As I have announced, we are able to describe a situation where hopes concerning 
an afterlife come true. Notice that this time we are moving on ground that is even 
more solid than in the case of the supernatural, which I've been discussing earlier 
on. In interpreting an envatted brain's talk about the "supernatural" or the "realm 
beyond nature", I had to ascribe a metaphorical mode of speech to the speaker. 
(The quasi-spatial expressions "super" and "beyond" could not be understood in 
their literal meaning.) This time, by contrast, I interpreted the envatted brain 
literally, tout court. In its literal meaning, the envatted expression "mental life" is 
semantically stable; so is the envatted expression "lasts longer than". 
Therefore, when we want to speculate about our chances concerning immortality, 
we can also speak in the literal, non-metaphorical mode: 
(22) Will my mental life last longer than the biological life of my body? 
Even when understood literally the question makes sense.38 What the right answer 
to this question is I do not know. It is not a question which can be answered by 
the natural sciences. Still it is a crucial question. It is a question from an old 
philosophical project—the project of metaphysics.39
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Notes
1  Compare Patzig [P]:35-45 as an example for the destruction of Plato's proofs 
(from the dialogue Phaidon). Throughout this paper, the phrase "immortality" is 
meant to cover both possibilities: either that the soul survives the body for a time 
or that it does so eternally. 
2  See, for example, Ayer [LTL]:117. 
3  What I have described here is of course only a sketch; the literature is full of more 
elaborate arguments. See, for example, Geach [MA]:111-117, [GS]:17-29 and 
Flew [LoM]:16-29, 102-106, 111/2, 115/6 et passim. See also Williams in H.D. 
Lewis (et al.) [LaD]:57-59. (Although Williams summarizes his position by way 
of saying: "[...] there is no such thing as immortality" ([LaD]:59), his point is 
clearly directed against the conceivability of that idea, as can be seen from the 
following quotation: "[...] you haven't got any control over the idea of a personal 
immortality" ([LaD]:58, my emphasis).) Williams' line of thought is related to a 
similar one by Strawson, see [I]:87ff., especially 97, 102. (Compare, however, 
Strawson [I]:115/6.) — To my knowledge, Carnap is the earliest writer whose 
views in the philosophy of mind imply very much the position I have sketched in 
the main text. See, for example, Carnap's first sentence in [PiPS]:107 (§1): "Es 
soll im folgenden die These erläutert und begründet werden, daß jeder Satz der 
Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache formuliert werden kann" ([PiPS]:107 (§1), 
italics omitted). Later on in the same paper, he says: "[...] ein Satz über 
Fremdpsychisches besagt, daß ein physikalischer Vorgang bestimmter Art am 
Leib der betreffenden Person stattfindet" ([PiPS]:117 (§4)). 
4  For the criterion of significance see Carnap [SiP]:47-54 (§7). (See also Schlick 
[MV]:339-43.)
5  Schlick [MV]:356. 
6  For a defense of that strategy, see Hick [TV]:258, 261-267. Compare also Hick 
[PoR]:100-102. These ideas have been criticized by Williams and Flew, see 
Williams [IS]:40, Flew [LoM]:112ff. and Flew [CMWH]:245-248. 
7  Among others, Ducasse and Schlick have not resisted the temptation to make up 
stories about ghosts. See Ducasse [ECfP]:225-228 and Schlick [MV]:357. 
8  See Putnam [RTH]:5/6, 12/3. In order to avoid philosophical perplexities as to the 
possibility of private languages, Putnam takes care that his envatted brain is not 
alone; he puts more brains to the vat, connects them all to one and the same 
computer and makes sure that they can exchange messages. 
9  Putnam [RTH]:7. 
10  That the first-person perspective is essential to Putnam's proof has been observed 
by Crispin Wright in [oPPT]:226/7. 
11  Putnam [RTH]:12/3. 
12  See Putnam [MoM]:223ff. 
13  Putnam [RTH]:3-5. Crispin Wright is one of those who easily agree with Putnam's 
externalism, see Wright [oPPT]:230-32. 
14  See Putnam [RTH]:15. 
15  See Putnam [RTH]:8. 
16  For the most attractive reconstruction of Putnam's proof, see Wright [oPPT], 
especially p. 224. 
17  This is one of the options which Putnam considers, see [RTH]:14. 
18  The English expression "semantically stable" has independently been used by 
other authors (see Grünbaum [IINP]:263-268, 272; Sankey [ITC]:460/1; Bealer 
[MP]:201, 204, 208, [APKS]:132, 134/5, 137, 142n13, [oPoP]:23-25, [IAoP]:228, 
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237n28, [MERR]:72, 105, 107, 114, 115, 120-123). Grünbaum's notion and 
Sankey's notion belong to quite specific, yet disjoint, contexts in the philosophy of 
science. By contrast, Bealer's notion was designed for metaphilosophical 
purposes: he introduced it to save the epistemological power of certain modal 
intuitions from attacks by scientific essentialism à la Kripke. As Putnam's 
externalism resembles Kripke's views in crucial respects, it is unsurprising that 
Bealer's notion of semantic stability bears a significant resemblance to the one I 
here invoke in order to deal with Putnam's insights. According to Bealer, "[a]n 
expression is semantically stable iff, necessarily, in any language group in an
epistemic situation qualitatively identical to ours, the expression would mean the 
same thing" (Bealer [APKS]:134, my italics; a related notion of "context-free 
terms" is defined by Hirsch [MNCT]:246/7, compare Bealer [MERR]:72n1). Let 
me highlight four differences between Bealer's notion and mine. (i) Where 
Bealer's definition appeals to meaning (which can be understood in many different 
ways), my definition appeals to translation instead (which I propose to spell out in 
terms of radical translation, or interpretation, see Müller [MSS], sections 3 and 4). 
A consequence of this difference is highlighted in endnote 23 below. (ii) Bealer's 
definition invokes necessity, which my definition does not. Modally, then, 
Bealer's notion is stricter than mine. But it remains unclear why such modal 
strengthening matters. (iii) Bealer's notion deals with language groups and thus, 
unlike mine, does not apply to a single speaker of some private idiolect (used by 
an envatted brain that is, perhaps, kept incommunicado; but see endnote 7). 
Bealer's choice is motivated by the wish to sidestep any potential problems that 
might arise from phenomena of linguistic division of labour: these phenomena 
cannot cause trouble for complete communities, and thus, can safely be ignored 
when applying Bealer's notion (see Bealer [oPoP]:33n31). (iv) Bealer's notion is 
not exclusively concerned with envatment, but more generally, with any non-
standard, but qualitatively conservative, variation in the speakers' environment. 
Therefore, less terms might qualify for semantic stability in Bealer's sense than in 
mine. This makes me wonder—given the almost unlimited imagination with 
which analytic philosophers concoct surprising stories—how we could ever be 
sure that a given term is semantically stable in Bealer's sense. Bealer does not 
seem to be worried by this. On the contrary, without much ado he comes up with 
quite extensive lists of stable terms (Bealer [APKS]:134/5, [oPoP]:23/4, 
[IAoP]:228, 237n28; compare Bealer [PLoS]:355/6 et passim for related ideas). In 
a monograph about semantic stability, I have by contrast felt the need to prove 
with detailed arguments that certain philosophical expressions (such as e.g. 
"kind") are semantically stable, in the sense of my weaker notion (which is 
restricted to envatment; see Müller [MSS], section 13). When I submitted these 
arguments in 2001 and published them in 2003, I was unaware of Bealer's earlier 
work, which I would have greeted with the enthusiasm of someone desperately 
looking for philosophical allies; differences aside, the overall similarity between 
the two independently conceived notions is striking and an indication of the 
fruitfulness of their root idea. In 2003 David Chalmers broached the very same 
idea, again independently from any earlier efforts by others. Without referencing 
such earlier efforts, he spoke of "semantic neutrality" (Chalmers [MaM], notes 1, 
9). In 2010, Chalmers does quote Bealer, however, and points out some 
differences between his own notion of semantic neutrality and Bealer's notion (see 
Chalmers [CoC]:203/4). Chalmers' notion on p. 204 presupposes the apparatus of 
two-dimensionalism (which is controversial, see e.g. Bealer [MERR]:87-99). Like 
me, but unlike Bealer, Chalmers applies the notion to envatment, for which 
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purpose the controversial apparatus proves inessential (Chalmers [MaM], notes 1, 
9 = Chalmers [CoC]:481, 487/8). The coincidences between Chalmers' 
conclusions and my own are so overwhelming that I was rather puzzled to learn 
about them when preparing the electronic version of the present paper. Déjà lu—
are we perhaps in the matrix, after all? [This endnote was added in 2012.] 
19  Alison Laywine, Felix Mühlhölzer, and Hilary Putnam have pointed out to me 
that it is not obvious that each temporal expression is semantically stable. 
Granted, in order to demonstrate the semantic stability of expressions such as 
"0.000075 seconds" more has to be done than is possible in this paper. Although 
this in an interesting issue, we need not worry about it here. The examples from 
the main text are sufficient for our purposes. 
20  Let us call a code X "300 cybermiles from" a code Y if, for example, the envatted 
brain, who enjoys a simulated trip with a simulated speed of 100 miles per hour, 
needs three hours in order to move from X-experiences to Y-experiences. 
21  A similar point is made by Putnam in [RTH]:14. 
22  Putnam says that his externalist reflections deliver "preconditions of reference and
hence of thought" ([RTH]:16, emphasis changed). 
23  Here lies the main difference between my account of semantic stability and 
Bealer's, who claims that "[the term] 'I' is paradigmatically semantically unstable"
(Bealer [MERR]:115, his emphasis; a possible reason for this difference is 
indicated above in endnote 18, item (i)). Unlike Bealer, I propose to deal with the 
term "I" in connection with other terms such as "think". Notice that even in the 
expression "my body", the indexical itself does not require changes when 
translated from our language to vat language: "my bit-body". [This endnote was 
added in 2012.]
24  The objection is credited to Paolo Casalegno and goes back to observations made 
by Strawson [I]:99. 
25  One might suspect that what I have said about non-referential functions of the 
mental vocabulary (at the end of the preceding section) begs the question against 
materialist doctrines such as (8). But the details of formulating materialism do not 
matter much for my argument; my argument works also against versions of 
materialism such as this one: "Whenever I believe something, then physical 
events of a certain type must occur". 
26  Or anyway, part of their identity depends on physical (neural) events in the brain;
this qualification leaves room for externalist versions of materialism which say 
that thoughts are based upon facts about the brain and facts about its environment. 
My main point remains untouched by this complication. Statement (8') still 
misrepresents the mental situation of an envatted brain. 
27  This has been pointed out to me by Christian Nimtz. The leading idea of my next 
paragraph is also credited to him. 
28  In contrasting factual with conceptual versions of materialism I have to appeal to 
the notion of analyticity, which many philosophers believe to have been 
demolished by W.V.O. Quine. (The locus classicus is Quine [TDoE].) I have 
shown elsewhere how Quine's objections against the distinction between analytic 
and synthetic sentences can be met. (See Müller [DQDT] and [SA]:240ff, 
especially p. 275.) As I was able to explicate analyticity exclusively in naturalist 
terms, it is appropriate to use that notion in our present context, where we are 
moving on the ground of naturalism and materialism. — Even so, one might 
wonder whether there are non-conceptualist versions of materialism which would 
also make the soul's immortality inconceivable. Couldn't my opponent invoke 
non-conceptualist materialism in the form of an apriori truth, or as a necessity? I 
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do not think so. The claim that the idea of immortality lacks meaning is a 
semantic claim, not an epistemological or modal claim. To see this, notice that 
there can be necessities (like "Water is H2O") as well as apriori truths (like "I am 
here now") whose falsity is conceivable rather than meaningless. 
29  Of course, there may be many different arguments against materialism as an 
analytic theory about the mental. As we shall see at the end of this paper, the 
(new) anti-materialist line of reasoning adopted here invites a straightforward 
application concerning immortality. By contrast, most of the anti-materialist 
arguments from the literature are at best loosely connected to our main concern. 
This is my excuse for ignoring what other writers have argued against 
conceptualist versions of materialism. 
30  Something close to this claim (including its motivation from the preceding 
paragraph) has been brought to my attention by Paolo Casalegno. (He did not 
subscribe to the claim, however; furthermore, he formulated it in terms of 
aprioricity rather than in terms of analyticity.) To prove the claim, more has to be 
done than is possible in this paper. The details of such a proof depend on the exact 
version of analyticity with which one wishes to work. The notion of analyticity 
that I have defined and defended elsewhere, for example, is built upon Quine's 
concept of sensory stimulation "at the surfaces of the speaker", such as visual 
stimuli at the retina of an ordinary human eye (see Quine [WO]:31f). Now an 
envatted brain does not have real eyes. Therefore, we are well advised to locate 
the stimuli in question still closer to the stimulated brain than in Quine's theory. I 
propose to substitute Quinean sensory stimulations by the neural input patterns as 
they arrive at the brain's interface. (This change does not affect much of the spirit 
of Quine's concept—nor of the usage I made of it in my definition of analyticity.) 
Having made this substitution, the proof of my claim is straightforward: Per
constructionem an envatted brain enjoys the very same neural input (and the very 
same reactions on its output) that we enjoy; this is so even during the process of 
language acquisition. Therefore, the envatted brain develops the same (verbal) 
dispositions to react on input that we do. Now it is merely these dispositions 
which matter for questions of analyticity (says my definition of that notion, see 
[DQDT]:93 and [SA]:275). So there will be no difference between our analytic 
truths and those from the language of an envatted brain. (Similar proofs are 
possible for more traditional versions of analyticity; for example, if you define 
analyticity in terms of (confirmatory and disconfirmatory) evidence, see Grice / 
Strawson [iDoD]:210.) 
 Is my claim incompatible with Putnam's externalism? Doesn't externalism prevent 
us from internally knowing what our words mean and refer to, and hence, from 
internally knowing what is true by virtue of meaning alone? No. Externalism is at 
stake when we seek to interpret someone's language from outside; it infects all 
interlingistic characterization of meaning, synonymy, and reference, but not their 
intralinguistic characterization. (That's why externalism is compatible with 
disquotationalist claims about reference.) Now analyticity can be defined in terms 
of intralinguistic synonymy and vice versa (see Quine [WO]:65, [TDiR]:271 and 
Müller [DQDT]:97 note 12); thus externalism does not matter for questions of 
analyticity. (The worry concerning analyticity and externalism is credited to 
Christian Nimtz, oral communication.) 
31  See previous endnote. 
32  Shoemaker faces similar problems when he urges that we should resist the 
temptation to define "immaterial substance" as meaning simply "substance that is 
not a material substance" ([ID]:114/5). 
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33  If an envatted brain repeated Shoemaker's contemplations on "Non-Cartesian 
Dualism" ([ID]:113ff.), then it might refer to itself (to the brain, that is) by way of 
Shoemaker's expression "ghostly brain" ([ID]:113). 
34  This is the envatted parallel to Kant's first antinomy concerning space, see Kant 
[KRV]:454-457* (A 426-433, B 454-461). 
35  Cf. Quine [WO]:59 and Davidson [oVIo]:196. 
36  This has been shown by Tetens in [FWMR]. 
37  When dualists are tempted to speak about "other material than physical matter" 
(Hick [TV]:265), or about "immaterial stuff" (Swinburne [PI]:27), they risk being 
charged with self-contradiction: "[...] speaking of immaterial stuff seems 
dangerously close to speaking of immaterial matter", cf. Shoemaker [SSR]:125. 
(The charge is rather old; it can be traced back to Hobbes who directed it against 
the expression "incorporeall substance", see [L]:17.) In his own, positive account, 
Shoemaker considers "immaterial substances" that can be individuated not 
spatially but only quasi-spatially ([ID]:114-118). He admits, however, that "[...] it 
is in a rather thin sense that it is 'conceivable' that there should be immaterial 
substances", because to say that some of the relationships between immaterial 
substances are quasi-spatial "is not to say what they would be" ([ID]:130, note 8). 
It seems that my line of thought (as regards the realm beyond nature) is directed 
towards a goal comparable to Shoemaker's. If I am not mistaken, our 
understanding of metaphorical expressions such as "quasi-spatial" becomes less 
thin than in Shoemaker's discussion, once we consider them as expressions from 
the vat language and contemplate their non-metaphorical translations into our 
language (see the preceding section). 
38  Notice that I have said nothing to defend the conceivability of the idea that after 
my physical death I will be the same person that I was while biologically alive. 
The question of personal survival raises additional problems which are beyond the 
scope of this paper; for a discussion see Shoemaker [ID] and H. Lewis (et al.) 
[LaD].
39  This is a modified version of a paper originally presented at the conference on 
Epistemology and Metaphysics of the Mental (October 1st—3rd, 2000, 
Internationales Wissenschaftszentrum, University Heidelberg). I am grateful to 
my commentator on this occasion, the late Paolo Casalegno, whose brilliant and 
sharp remarks have helped me see more clearly which version of materialism 
should have been my target. I also want to thank Wolfgang Carl, Andreas 
Kemmerling, Christian Nimtz, Sven Rosenkranz, and Hans-Peter Schütt for 
valuable criticism of the paper's first version. I am indebted to Alison Laywine 
and Cherilyn Keall for stylistic advice. I also wish to express my gratitude to both 
Hilary Putnam and Holm Tetens, who convinced me in 1996/7 that what I am 
trying to do here is metaphysics proper. (In Putnam's view, this is an objection, in 
Tetens' view, it is not.) Indeed, their reactions to my first attempts at applying the 
notion of semantic stability to envatted brains have led me to embark on a 
metaphysical adventure. I presented the resulting paper to Putnam in April 1997 
(Müller [AZ]), and gave presentations of it in Berlin (FU, January 9th, 1997), 
Munich (LMU, September 17th, 1997), Göttingen (November 25th, 1997), Bonn 
(April 30th, 1998), Konstanz (July 2nd, 1998), Heidelberg (July 11th, 2000), 
Hannover (January 9th, 2001), and Bayreuth (December 18th 2001). English 
versions were delivered in the Philosophy Club at St. Andrews (May 1st, 2002) 
and at the conference The Limits of Knowledge, Berlin (FU, July 9th, 2002). Many 
of the critical remarks from the audiences on these occasions have helped me gain 
clarity about the nature of my project and the best way to argue for its central 
Consciousness without Physical Basis 
29
claims. To my surprise, nobody seemed to regard the project's overall goals 
tenable.
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